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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Within his Brief, dated February 11, 1992 the Substitute 
Appellee, Paul H. Richins ("Richins"), has indicated no objection 
to the "Statement of the Issues Presented for Review, " which 
appears upon pages 1-3 of Appellants1 ("Burtons") principal 
brief, dated November 26, 1991. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although R i c h i n s ' Brief c o n t a i n s no o b j e c t i o n t o t h e 
"Statement of F a c t s , " which appears on pages 5-16 of Burton's 
p r inc ipa l br ief , Richins ' Brief contains a separate "Statement of 
the Case" and "Statement of Material Facts," which include 
numerous factual and legal assertions which Burtons dispute. 
Rather than burdening the Court with a point-by-point refutation 
of such assertions, many of which are clearly immaterial or 
conclusory in nature. Burtons hereby object to Richins' 
"Statement of the Case" and "Statement of Material Facts" in 
their entirety as not being authorized under URAP 24(b). Burtons 
reserve their objections to each specific factual allegation 
within Richins' Brief, and respectfully refer the Court to 
Burtons' principal Brief for the uncontested facts of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Burtons argue within Point I of their principal Brief that 
notwithstanding Willard Wood's purported conveyance of his 
interest within the Laura Kay property to his wife, Tonya Wood, 
by Special Warranty Deed, dated May 1, 1980, Willard Wood had an 
interest in the property at the time that Burtons' judgment lien 
attached, during June of 1981. Burtons maintain that, because 
the conveyance from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood was admittedly 
fraudulent,^ said conveyance was void in toto, and Burtons were 
justified in disregarding such conveyance and in executing upon 
^Mr. Wood expressly stated in his Deposition that the 
purpose of his Deed to Mrs. Wood was to shield the property from 
Mr. Wood's creditors. Wood Depo., pages 18-22. 
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the interest of Mr. Wood, through his successors-in-interest, the 
Baldwins. Burtons further submit that DCA Section 25-1-15(2) of 
the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act expressly authorized Burtons 
to disregard the fraudulent conveyance and execute upon the 
property. 
Richins' primary response on this point is to repeat over 
and over that Mr. Wood had no interest in the property at the 
time that Burton's judgment was docketed, and that Burtons' lien 
therefore did not attach to the property. Burtons agree with 
Richins1 statement that "If the property was not owned by him 
[Mr. Wood] at the time, then no lien attached." Richins Brief, 
page 19. However, the issue in this case is whether Mr. Wood had 
an interest in the property at the time that Burtons' judgment 
was docketed, or subsequent thereto.2 
Subsequent to Mr. Wood's May 1, 1980 Deed to Mrs. Wood, 
Mr. Wood and Mrs. Wood executed the September 30, 1981 Warranty 
Deed on the Property to Lynda and Gregory Baldwin. In addition, 
prior to his conveyance to the Baldwins, Mr. Wood executed a 
Trust Deed to Valley Bank and Trust Company as security for a 
Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) loan. (Wood Depo., page 17 
and Exhibit "5.") Therefore, even if the initial conveyance from 
Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood was valid, it appears that the property was 
subsequently reconveyed to Mr. Wood by the time that Baldwins 
purchased the property. This conclusion is consistent with 
Mr. Wood's testimony that he believed that he had an interest in 
the property at the time he executed the Deed to Baldwins. 
(R. 071, 235.) Since a judgment lien attaches to after-acquired 
property of the debtor under UCA Section 78-22-1, Burtons' lien 
attached at the time of any such reconveyance. 
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Richins also argues that the fraudulent conveyance from 
Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood was not void, but merely voidable, so that 
Burtons could not directly execute upon the property without 
first bringing an action to set aside the conveyance. Richins1 
Brief, pages 31-34. In so arguing, Richins ignores the express 
language of UCA Section 25-1-8, and of the four Utah cases which 
were discussed on pages 19-20 of Burtons1 principal Brief.3 
Instead, Richins relies upon several cases from other 
jurisdictions, which are simply not controlling upon Utah law. 
Richins also attempts to draw support from Butler 
v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987). However, contrary to 
the assertion on page 39 of Richins' Brief, there is nothing 
within Butler which implies that a fraudulent conveyance is 
merely voidable. To the contrary, page 1262 of Butler repeatedly 
states that such conveyances are "void." The holding in Butler 
is that a creditor cannot disregard a fraudulent conveyance 
and execute upon fraudulently conveyed property which is in the 
hands of a third-party bona fide purchaser. Butler does not 
prohibit a creditor from disregarding a fraudulent conveyance and 
executing upon property in the hands of a third party who is not 
3Jensen v. Eames, 519 P.2d 236 (Utah 1974); W.P. Noble 
Mercantile Co. v. Mt. Pleasant Equitable Co-op Inst., 42 P. 869 
(Utah 1894) ; Meyer v. General American Corporations, 569 P.2d 
1094, 1098 (Utah 1977); Cardon v. Harper, 151 P.2d 99, 102 (Utah 
1944) . 
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a bona fide purchaser. Although Butler may be relevant to 
Baldwin's claim that she is a bona fide purchaser (See Point III, 
infra), Butler does not require that a creditor bring an action 
to set aside a fraudulent conveyance whenever the property has 
been conveyed to a third party. 
Burtons raised an important point within Point II of their 
principal Brief, which should have more properly been raised 
under Point I. That point is that the entire issue of fraudulent 
conveyance is immaterial to this action because, for whatever 
reason, Burtons1 judgment lien appears in the public record as 
having attached to the property prior to Baldwin's purchase of 
the property. At the time of Burtons' execution, Burtons had no 
knowledge of, or way of knowing about, any prior fraudulent 
conveyance, nor did it appear that any fraudulent conveyance 
could have any effect upon Burtons' lien. At the time of 
Burtons' execution, the record did indicate the May 1, 1980 
Deed from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood, but the record also reflected 
Mr. Wood's May 26, 1980 Trust Deed to Valley Bank and Mr. Wood's 
September 30, 1981 Deed to Baldwins, prior to which Burtons' lien 
had attached. Thus, it appears that the entire fraudulent 
conveyance issue is peripheral in this case, and that the case 
merely involves a straight-forward execution by Burtons and a 
subsequent attempt by Baldwins to set aside the execution based 
upon an error in the public records. One of the elements of 
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Baldwins' action to set aside Burtons' execution was to establish 
the validity of the May, 1980 Deed from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood. 
In defense to the merits of Baldwins' claim, Burtons properly 
asserted the invalidity of the Deed. Such defense did not 
constitute an affirmative defense inasmuch as it contested 
the merits of Baldwins' claim and did not seek to avoid the 
claim. 
POINT II 
Burtons argued on pages 22-30 of their principal Brief that 
the District Court erred in summarily concluding that any action 
by Burtons to set aside a fraudulent conveyance between the Woods 
was time-barred. 
Burtons' primary point on this issue is that no action to 
set aside the fraudulent conveyance was necessary, inasmuch as 
Burtons merely sought to execute upon their judgment, for which 
the applicable statute of limitations is the eight-year period 
established by UCA Section 78-22-1. Burtons held no way of 
knowing that a fraudulent conveyance issue existed until Baldwins 
filed this action, alleging that Mr. Wood had divested himself of 
any interest in the property through the May lr 1980 Deed. 
At the time of Burtons' execution, the record disclosed that 
Burtons' lien had attached to the Property, and that Mr. Wood had 
subsequently conveyed his interest to the Baldwins. Based upon 
that status. Burtons properly proceeded to execute upon their 
lien. 
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Even if Burtons were required to pursue their claim against 
the property within the time prescribed for attacking a 
fraudulent conveyance, an issue of fact exists as to when Burtons 
should have discovered the fraudulent conveyance. 
Richins argues that Burtons should have discovered the fraud 
"(i) in May of 1980, when the Willard Wood Deed was recorded, 
(ii) in June 1991, when the judgment was entered in the Burton 
lawsuit; or (iii) in September 1981, when the Kofoed Trust Deed 
and Woods' Deed were recorded and Baldwins took open and 
notorious possession of the property." Richins Brief, page 28. 
Regarding May of 1980, Burtons had no claim against Mr. Wood 
at that time, and no interest in the property. 
Regarding June and September of 1981, Richins' Brief at page 
29 describes the information which was available to Burtons on 
those dates: 
"Reasonable diligence" in collecting a money 
judgment would require that at the time of or some time 
after acquiring the Judgment, Burtons would research 
the public record for any real property owned or 
recently transferred by Willard Wood, particularly his 
residence. Had they done so, Burtons would have 
discovered not one, but three deeds: (i) the Willard 
Wood Deed, recorded in May 1980, (ii) the Kofoed Trust 
Deed, recorded in September 1981, and (iii) the Woods' 
Deed, recorded in September 1981. Armed with such 
information. Burtons could have easily deposed Willard 
Wood to discover why he executed the two deeds in 1981 
after he had conveyed his estate in 1980. If Burtons 
then believed the 1980 deed was fraudulent in light of 
the 1990 [sic] deeds, Burtons could have challenged it 
then, in 1981, or within three years thereafter. 
Therefore, the statute of limitations could begin to 
run no later than September 1981, when the Kofoed Trust 
Deed and Wood's Deed were recorded, and the Willard 
Wood Deed was clearly evident. 
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Burtons submit that the record as of June and September 
1980 could not have placed them or any other reasonable creditor 
on notice of a fraudulent conveyance* It is true that the May 
1980 Deed from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood would appear a little odd in 
conjunction with the subsequent conveyance from Mr. Wood to 
Baldwins, but Mr. Wood's execution of the Baldwin Deed, together 
with his use of the property as security to Valley Bank, and the 
record lien of the Burtons, would convince any reasonable 
creditor that its lien had properly attached, and could be 
executed upon within the time established by UCA Section 
78-22-1. Burtons deny Richins' assertion that Burtons could have 
"easily deposed Willard Wood,n or that the status of the property 
at that time was such that Burtons should have deemed it 
necessary to commence a lawsuit. 
Regarding the Deed to Baldwins and Baldwins" "open and 
notorious possession" of the property, such events had no 
necessary or even likely effect upon Burtons' lien. Baldwins 
merely took their interest in the property subject to Burtons' 
lien. 
POINT III 
Within Point III of Burtons' principal Brief, pages 30-36, 
Burtons argued that the District Court erred in holding that 
Baldwins were bona fide purchasers ("BFP") of the property. The 
reasons that such holding was error are that: (1) The Burton 
judgment was of record, and imparted constructive notice of its 
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existence at the time Baldwins purchased the property; (2) 
substantial issues of fact exist with respect to Baldwins' BFP 
status; and (3) Baldwins lost their BFP status through the 
foreclosure of the Kofoed Trust Deed and Baldwins' subsequent 
repurchase of the property. 
There are actually two potential BFP issues in this case. 
If the Court accepts Burtons' argument that this action involves 
a straight-forward execution by Burtons that did not require the 
setting aside of a fraudulent conveyance, then the only BFP claim 
available to Baldwins is that they took the property without 
notice of Burton's lien. This claim is untenable because 
Burtons' lien was of record and at least constructively known to 
Baldwins at the time of their purchase. 
If the Court should determine that Burtons' execution 
required an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, the BFP 
question is whether Baldwins obtained the property without 
knowledge of the fraudulent transfer from Mr Wood to Mrs. Wood. 
Burtons submit that an issue of fact exists with respect to this 
point, considering that: (1) the Deed from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood 
was of record; (2) Mr. Wood signed both the Baldwins Warranty 
Deed and the Kofoed's Trust Deed, notwithstanding he had no 
apparent interest in the property; (3) Mr. Wood had executed a 
Trust Deed upon the property to Valley Bank, as security for a 
loan which was paid off in conjunction with the sale to Baldwins; 
(4) Baldwins knew that Mr. Wood was experiencing financial 
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difficulties at the time of the sale (Baldwin Depo., page 5); (5) 
Mr. Wood testified that he executed the Warranty Deed to Baldwins 
because he regarded himself as having an interest in the 
property, notwithstanding his prior conveyance to Mrs. Wood 
(R. 071, R. 235); (6) the recital in the August 23, 1981 Earnest 
Money Agreement to the transfer of an unidentified lien and the 
discrepancies in the testimonies of Mr. Wood and Mr. Baldwin 
regarding such lien (Wood Depo., page 17; Baldwin Depo*, page 9); 
(7) the fact that Baldwins' title agent, Western States Title 
Co., had actual knowledge of the Burtons' judgment; and (8) 
Mr. Wood executed the August 23, 1991 Earnest Money Agreement as 
a "Seller." 
Burtons submit that these facts are sufficient to avoid 
summary judgment upon the BFP issue. Of course, neither Baldwins 
nor Woods expressly admit any fraudulent conduct, as is usually 
the case in actions alleging fraud. However, fraud must often be 
established through circumstantial evidence. In the present 
case, there is a substantial inference from the circumstances 
that Baldwins knew of the questionable validity of Mrs. Wood's 
purported exclusive ownership of the property. 
Even if Baldwins were BFPs under the Warranty Deed from 
Woods, Baldwins subsequently lost such BFP status. The Baldwins' 
interest under the Wood Deed was foreclosed upon by Kofoed's 
successor-in-interest during May of 1987 (R. 270). A Trustee's 
Deed was subsequently issued in favor of the Kofoed's 
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successor-in-interest (R. 269-271). Said Trustee's Deed was 
subsequently assigned to Mr. Baldwin's employer, and was then 
assigned to Mrs. Baldwin in October of 1987 (R. 280, 281). The 
Baldwins provided no consideration for such assignment (Baldwin 
Depo., pages 28-30). 
The interest which Baldwins received from Woods, allegedly 
as BFPs in September of 1981, was extinguished by the foreclosure 
of the Kofoed Trust Deed in June of 1987. When Lynda Baldwin 
regained the property in October of 1987, she clearly had 
knowledge of the alleged fraudulent transfer between the Woods, 
and cannot claim to have received such interest as a BFP. 4 
Richins1 primary argument on the BFP issue is that Baldwins 
could not have had notice of Burtons' lien because Burtons had 
no valid lien. This is merely a boot-strapping of Richins1 
argument about Mr. Wood not having had an interest in the 
property. Richins noticeably ignores all of the factual 
circumstances from which fraud may be inferred in this case. 
POINT IV 
Burtons argued in Point IV of their principal Brief, pages 
37-39, that assuming arguendo the District Court properly vacated 
Burtons' Sheriff Deed, it nevertheless erred in awarding Baldwin 
^There is no evidence in the record as to whether Kofoeds 
received their interest in the property as BFPs under the 
September 30, 19 81 Trust Deed, and the District Court made no 
finding on that issue. In any event, Kofoed's potential BFP 
status should be immaterial in relation to a subsequent purchaser 
who has actual knowledge of the alleged fraud. 
her attorney's fees. The District Court did not state the legal 
basis for such award, but described the award as "damages." 
Burtons' principal Brief argued that the possible theories 
under which the District Court may have awarded attorney's fees 
include: (a) wrongful execution; (b) slander of title; or (c) 
bad faith under UCA Section 78-27-56. Richins' Brief, at pages 
43-52, accepts these theories as the potential bases for the 
District Court's award of Baldwin's attorney's fees. Richins 
also adds Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 11 as a potential basis. 
Whatever the legal basis for the award, the sine qua non for 
an award of attorney's fees in this case is bad faith on the part 
of the Burtons. However, there is no evidence of bad faith by 
the Burtons in this case. Burtons merely executed upon their 
judgment lien, which was of record. In fact, if Burtons had not 
conducted the execution, their lien would have been foreclosed 
under the Kofoed Trust Deed. 
On pages 45-46 of his Brief, Richins presents nineteen (19) 
factors which he construes as evidence of Burtons' bad faith. 
However, all of these factors, except one, merely constitute 
legal conclusions based upon Richins' theory of the case. The 
only fact cited by Richins, which was also mentioned by the 
District Court, was Burtons' alleged improper preparation of the 
execution documents. 
Burtons' August 6, 1986 Writ of Execution was against the 
property of "Willard D. Wood." (Richins' Brief, Exhibit "D.") 
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All other execution documents were directed against the interest 
of the Baldwins as "successors-in-interest of Willard D. Wood." 
As an initial matter, if Baldwins were not BFPs, then 
Mr. Wood's Deed to Baldwins, like his previous Deed to Mrs. Wood, 
was void and Burtons were entitled to execute upon Mr. Wood's 
interest in the property. The subsequent Execution and Praecipe 
merely clarified the status of Mr. Wood's interest in the 
property, i.e., having been nominally conveyed to Baldwins. The 
technical discrepancy between the Writ of Execution and the other 
documents was immaterial since Baldwins had no valid interest in 
the property. 
More importantly, whether or not Baldwins were fraudulent 
transferees in this case, Burtons conduct was expressly 
authorized by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69(j), which states: 
(j) Where property is claimed by third person. 
If an officer shall proceed to levy any execution on 
any goods or chattels claimed by any person other than 
the defendant, or should he be requested by the 
judgment creditor so to do, such officer may require 
the judgment creditor to give an undertaking, with good 
and sufficient sureties, to pay all costs and damages 
that he may sustain by reason of the detention or sale 
of such property; and until such undertaking is given, 
the officer may refuse to proceed against such 
property. 
This provision apparently authorizes Burtons' actions in 
this case, as did U.C.A. Section 25-1-15(2). In any event, it 
cannot reasonably be said that Burtons acted in bad faith. 
POINT V 
Burtons argued within Point V of their principal Brief, 
pages 39-43, that even if the District Court properly awarded 
Baldwins attorney's fees, it erred in including within such award 
over Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) in "paralegal costs" on 
the grounds that (a) Utah law does not authorize recovery of 
paralegal expenses, and (b) even if such expenses are sometimes 
recoverable, they should not be allowed in the present case, 
where there is insufficient evidence of the attorney's control 
over the expenses claimed by the paralegal. 
Mr. Richins' billing contains huge blocks of time designated 
merely as "research." Further, Mr. Richins has apparently billed 
for several items which have absolutely nothing to do with the 
present action. This case clearly illustrates the need for 
close attorney supervision over the conduct of paralegals, 
particularly with regard to billing practices. 
Richins argues that there is no evidence that he acted 
outside the supervision of Baldwin's attorney. Richins' Brief 
at 57. However, such evidence appears within Richins' billing 
statement itself and particularly within its substantial 
deviation from the detailed manner in which Baldwins' attorney 
accounted for his time. Richins continues to act outside the 
scope of attorney supervision in the present action. While 
Richins' technical legal standing to defend this appeal results 
from his ownership of the money judgment against Appellants, his 
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defense of the appeal covers numerous l e g a l i s s u e s d i r e c t l y 
r e l a t i n g t o t h e B a l d w i n s ' r e a l p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . The 
de t e rmina t i on of those issues could prejudice the Baldwins far 
beyond the l o s s of a Seven Thousand Eight Hundred D o l l a r s 
($7,800.00) money judgment. 
POINT VI 
In Point VI of their principal Brief, Burtons responded to 
Richins' argument that Willard Wood's bankruptcy in December or 
1983 had the effect of voiding Burtons' lien. Burtons cited 11 
USC Section 506(d) and 524 and several cases which establish that 
a judgment creditor has the option of disregarding the bankruptcy 
and executing directly upon its lien. 
Richins' only response to this is to say that Burtons' lien 
could not pass through the bankruptcy because Burtons never had a 
valid lien. Richins' Brief, pages 20-21. This is merely 
boots-strapping the question of the validity of Burtons' lien. 
Assuming that Burtons' did have a valid lien, Richins makes no 
argument that such lien could not have been executed upon outside 
of Mr. Wood's bankruptcy. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts, authorities and argument, 
Burtons pray that this Honorable Court reverse the decision of 
the District Court and Order that Burtons' Sheriff Deed be 
reinstated. In the alternative, should the Court determine that 
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genuine issues of material fact preclude the entry of summary 
judgment for either party at this time, Burtons request that this 
case be remanded to the District Court for action consistent with 
this Court's decision. 
DATED this ^ day of April, 1992. 
PERKINSf.SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
DAVID H. fSCHWOBE 
Attorney for Defendants Burton 
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